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WELFARE RIGHTS IN A  CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY*
FRANK  I. MICHELMAN**
Some years  ago I speculated that persons in our country might have
not  only moral but constitutional  rights to  provision for certain basic
ingredients of individual welfare, such as food, shelter, health care, and
education.'  That  suggestion,  which  we  might  call  the  welfare-rights
thesis, has found  some  strong support,2 but also  has  met  its share  of
skeptical, critical, and even derisive rejoinder.  Several objections have
been  lodged:  that the concept  of welfare rights is fanciful, uncorrobo-
rated  by  legal  texts  or decisions;3  that the notion  is  ill-conceived  be-
cause  there  is  no  justiciable  standard  for  determining  when  the
*  A lecture delivered  at Washington  University on  February 28,  1979,  as the seventh in a
Neries  on  The Quest/or Equality
** Professor  of Law,  Harvard University.  B.A.,  1957, Yale University; J.D.,  1960,  Harvard
University.
1.  Michelman,  The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword On Protecting  the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment,  83  HARV.  L.  REV.  7 (1969);  Michelman,  In Pursuit of Constitutional
JJ'efare  Rights.,  One View  of  Rawls' Theory of Justice,  121  U. PA.  L. REv. 962  (1973)  [hereinafter
cited as Michelman,  Welfare Rights].  See also Michelman,  Formal  andAssociationaldims  in Pro-
4edural  Due Process, in DUE  PROCESS (Nomos  XVIII)  126,  144-45  (J. Pennock ed.  1977)  [herein-
after cited as Michelman,  Formal  and 4ssociationalAims  in Procedural  Due Process];  Michelman,
States' Rights and States' Roles:  Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League  of Cities  v.
Usery',  86  YALE L.J.  1165  (1977).
2.  See, e.g.,  L.  TRIBE,  AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  918-21  (1978);  Grey,  Procedural
Fairness  and  Substantive Rights, in  DUE  PROCESS  (Nonos XVIII)  182,  197-202  (J. Pennock ed.
1977)  [hereinafter  cited  as Grey,  Procedural  Fairness  and  Substantive Rights]; Tribe,  Unraveling
National  League of Cities:  The New Federalism  and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government
Services. 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977).  See also Grey, Propert, andNeed" The Wefare State and
Theories of Distributive  Justice,  28  STAN.  L.  REV.  877  (1976).
3.  See, e.g.,  R. POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAW  503-04 (2d ed.  1977).
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supposed rights are satisfied; that the courts, in the absence of a justici-
able standard, cannot presume to define or enforce these rights without
usurping  legislative  and  executive  roles;4 that judicial  vindication  of
these rights would be illegitimate and undemocratic  because nothing in
our traditional law or written Constitution signifies any general accept-
ance of the obligations these  rights entail;5 that the  claim of rights is
misdirected, not in the best interest of the supposed rights-holders;6 and
that the claim is immoral because it attacks the basic liberties of those
who would be called upon to satisfy it.7  These are all forceful  objec-
tions, and I do not take them lightly.  I think, however, that my sugges-
tion about welfare rights can survive them, and ought to be accepted.
Before  proceeding,  I  want  to  limit  my  claim  by  specifying  what I
mean  when  I  speak  of  a  "constitutional  right"  to  subsistence  (or
whatever).'  A person, I want to say, has a legal right to some state of
affairs, S, if:  (1) it is recognized  that the person has an interest  of his
own  in  S;  (2)  recognition  of that  individual  interest  regularly  and
detectibly exerts (or should exert) a practically significant influence  on
judicial decisions in a direction evidently favorable to fulfillment of the
interest; and (3) that influence depends on it being S that is at stake, as
distinguished  from the generality  of other interests  this person  might
have, and others have.  The personal interest in S is thus legally picked
out from  the mine-run of interests  a person  has and accorded  special
weight  in the resolution  of legal  disputes.9  To this it  must be  added
that I am speaking not just of legal  but, more specifically,  of constitu-
tional rights-of interests that make a difference  in  determinations  of
the legal validity of a statute or action taken under statutory authority.
For  illustration,  suppose  you  were  asked  to  consider  the  truth  of
these four statements:  (1) persons have a constitutional right to be pro-
vided with adequately nourishing food to eat, at state expense if neces-
4.  See Frug, The JudicialPower  of  the Purse,  126 U. PA.  L. REV.  715 (1978);  Monaghan,  The
Constitution Goes to Harvard,  13  HARV.  C.R.-C.L. L. REV.  117  (1978);  Winter, Poverty; Econonic
Equality, and  the Equal  Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REV.  41.
5.  See Monaghan,  supra note 4; Winter, supra note  4.
6.  See Winter, supra note 4.  But see R. POSNER,  supra note 3,  at  503-04.
7.  See Winter, supra note  4.  See also C.  FRIED,  RIGHT  AND  WRONG chs.  5-6  (1978).
8.  Cf. R. DWORKIN,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY  90-93  (1977);  C. FRIED, supra note 7;  L.
TRIBE, suara  note 2; Grey, Procedural  Fairness  and  Substantive  Rights, supra note 2;  Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?,  27  STAN.  L.  REV.  703  (1975).
9.  This  approach  follows  Dworkin's  notion  of rights  as  "trumps,"  as  distinguished  from
aims and goals.  See R. DWORKIN, supra note  8, at xi, 90-91.  I  also adopt his distinctions  among
background,  legislative, and legal rights.  See id  at  93,  101.
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sary; (2) persons have a constitutional right to a state-subsidized college
education;  (3)  persons  have  a  constitutional  right  to  live  freely  in
household groupings with whomever  they choose to associate;  and  (4)
persons have a constitutional right to employment suited to their abili-
ties.  Suppose  further  that  existing  state  statutes  generally  authorize
subsistence  allowances  and college  tuition  allowances  for needy resi-
dents, but deny these benefits to those who have resided in the state for
less than a year and to those who live in households not bound together
by family ties.  These statutes also stipulate that benefits may be cut off
without prior notice  if suspicions arise  about eligibility.  Suppose you
then  observe the following series  of judicial decisions  and governmen-
tal responses:  (a) the durational residency  requirement for subsistence
allowances  is held  unconstitutional  as a denial of the equal protection
of the  laws,  and the state,  required  by the  court either  to abolish the
allowances altogether or to extend them to new residents, does the lat-
ter; 0  (b)  the durational  residency  requirement  for college  tuition al-
lowances  is  upheld against  equal  protection  attack;t'  (c)  the  related-
household  requirement for subsistence allowances is held to violate the
equal protection  clause,  and the state, ordered to either abolish or ex-
tend  the allowances,  elects  to  extend  them;' 2  (d)  the court  sustains  a
zoning  regulation  that  bars  "unrelated"  households  from  residing  in
sizable  areas or whole municipalities  (for no very urgent practical rea-
son that  anyone can  cite);'3  (e)  termination  of subsistence allowances
without a prior eligibility hearing is held to be an unconstitutional dep-
rivation  of "property"  without  due  process  of law,  and the  state  re-
sponds with a provision for the required pretermination hearings; 4  (f)
termination of tuition allowances, 15  and of employment of state college
teachers,'6  before a hearing  on the asserted grounds for termination  is
upheld against due process attack.
This series of decisions,  I claim, would be evidence of recognition  of
a constitutional right to the means of subsistence as distinguished from
10.  See Shapiro v. Thompson,  394 U.S. 618  (1969).
11.  See Starns v.  Malkerson,  326 F. Supp.  234 (D. Minn.  1970), affid, 401 U.S. 985  (1971).
12.  See United  States Dep't of Agriculture v.  Moreno, 413  U.S. 528  (1973).
13.  See Village of Belle Terre  v.  Boraas,  416 U.S.  1 (1974).
14.  See Goldberg v.  Kelly, 397  U.S.  254 (1970).
15.  But cf  Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)  (invalidating "irrebuttable presumption" of
current  nonresidency  from  fact of prior nonresidency).
16.  See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.  134  (1974).  See also Harrah Independent School Dist.
v. Martin,  440 U.S. 194 (1979)  (employment  not a "fundamental  constitutional  right").
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a right  to  a  college  education,  to  a job, or to  live  in an "unrelated"
household.  The series can be construed to reflect a certain imputation
of purposes  to the several  statutory  schemes or certain motives  to the
legislators who enacted them.  It is as if the courts somehow know both
that  the legislature  enacted  the  subsistence  allowance  in response  to
what legislators  took  to be a valid political  claim on the part of each
resident to be ensured by the state against starvation and malnutrition 7
and that the statutes providing for tuition allowances  and teacher  em-
ployment reflect either a legislative judgment that the total social bene-
fits  of these  activities  exceed  their  total  social  costs  or  an  arbitrary
outcome of interest-group politics.  Given these assumptions about stat-
utory purposes,  one can easily see how the prior-residency  and related-
household  requirements  can  be  called  irrational  or  discriminatory  as
applied to the subsistence allowance (because, as is obvious, new arriv-
als  and unrelated-household  members  need  food  as much  as  anyone
else),  but not as applied to the other programs.'8  One can also see the
clear sense in which denial of subsistence, but not of college attendance
or a teaching job, on the basis of an erroneous or untested suspicion of
noneligibility would deprive a person of "property"  without due proc-
ess of law.'9
Of course, it is obvious not only that a court generally has no way of
making such motivational  findings, but also that the crucial  finding is
directly contradicted in our illustrative case by what the legislature has
actually done.  Granted that a subsistence allowance  meant to satisfy a
right to needed food could not rationally or consistently be conditioned
on a related-household  or prior-residency  requirement, it must follow
that the legislature, by attaching precisely this condition, has indicated
that the satisfaction of subsistence rights  and needs was  not its aim.
That is just the point I am driving at.  In the face of apparently con-
tradictory  legislative  action,  the  court treats  the  statute  as  though  its
sole or overriding purpose was to feed the needy-hungry.  A necessary,
if implicit, premise  of this judicial action  seems to be that the legisla-
ture  legally  ought to have meant  its statute  that way  (even  though  it
evidently did not).  The court treats the statute as if the legislature was
acting  in response to a right  to  subsistence (even  though  it evidently
17.  It need not be a claim  to be thus ensured at all costs.  See R. DWORKIN,  supra note 8, at
92.
18.  See generally Linde,  Due Process  of  Lawmaking, 55  NEB.  L. REv.  197  (1975).
19.  See Grey, Procedural  Fairness  and  Substantive Rights, supra note  2,  at  197-202.
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was  not).  It very  much  looks  like  a  constitutional  right  is  at  work.
Courts themselves cannot bring social service programs into existence;
but when legislatures  do so, courts can treat those legislative actions as
meant  to satisfy rights, with significant  consequences  for litigation  in-
volving statutory  interpretation  or interaction  with constitutional  doc-
trines such as  irrational classification.
The series  of decisions  that  I  say  would be  strong  evidence of the
existence of a constitutional  right to the means of subsistence  is not a
mere  fantasy,  but  a  thinly  fictionalized  report  of  various  decisions
handed  down  by the  United  States  Supreme  Court  over the six-year
period  from  1969 to  1974.20  Some additional  decisions  of this period
could be cited as similarly supportive of the welfare-rights thesis.2  The
thesis, however, cannot be established  by any purely empirical method
because a number of decisions over the same period and since seem to
contradict  the thesis by  their rhetoric as  well as  their results.2 2  More-
20.  See  cases cited notes  10-16 supra.
21.  Compare Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)  (one-year durational residency condition on
eligibility to sue for divorce in state's courts upheld), and  Starns v. Malkerson,  401 U.S. 985 (1971)
(upholding one-year durational residency  condition on eligibility for reduced  state college tuition
rate),  with Memorial  Hosp. v.  Maricopa  County, 415  U.S. 250  (1974)  (one-year durational resi-
dency condition on indigent person's entitlement to nonemergency  medical care at public expense
invalid), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)  (durational residency condition on avail-
ability  of AFDC  benefits  unconstitutional);  compare United  States  Dep't  of  Agriculture  v.
Moreno,  413  U.S. 528  (1973)  (exclusion  from food-stamp program of unrelated households inva-
lid), United States Dep't of Agriculture  v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973)  (exclusion from food-stamp
program of households including someone else's claimed tax dependent invalid), and  New Jersey
Welfare  Rights Organization  v. Cahill,  411  U.S. 619  (1973)  (exclusion  from  welfare-subsistence
benefits of families with only illegitimate children invalid),  with Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976)  (extra procedural  hurdles for  illegitimates claiming  social security  survivors'  benefits up-
held); compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67  (1972)  (scheme allowing  ex parte creditor's  repos-
session of household  goods  invalid),  Goldberg  v.  Kelly,  397  U.S.  254  (1970)  (termination  of
welfare benefits without prior notice  and  hearing violates due process),  and Sniadach v. Family
Fin.  Corp., 395  U.S.  337  (1969)  (ex  parte creditor's  wage attachment  scheme  invalid),  with Ma-
thews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)  (scheme allowing prehearing termination of social security
disability  benefits upheld),  and Board  of Regents  v.  Roth,  408  U.S.  564  (1972)  (termination of
teacher's employment  contract without notice or hearing not a denial of due process).  For an in-
depth  discussion of these cases,  see text  accompanying  notes  130-88  infra (appendices).  For an
argument that recent decisions invalidating  restrictions on professional advertising on first amend-
ment  grounds, see  Bates v.  State  Bar, 433  U.S.  350 (1977);  Virginia  State Bd.  of Pharmacy  v.
Virginia  Consumers Council, Inc., 425  U.S. 748  (1976);  Bigelow v. Virginia, 421  U.S.  809 (1975),
may imply special  constitutional solicitude  for "the  poor man's access to basic needs," see  Note,
4ccess of the Poor to Basic Economic Needs:. A  New Concern in Freedom of  Speech Decisions,  54
IND.  L.J.  83  (1978).
22.  See Lavine v.  Milne,  424  U.S.  577,  584  n.9  (1976)  (dictum)  (no constitutional  right  to
guaranteed  minimum  support  level);  San Antonio  Independent  School Dist.  v.  Rodriguez, 411
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over, the Court itself placed the supportive decisions on grounds other
than welfare  rights, though in a few cases  ambiguously.z 3
Many  or  all  of  the  ostensibly  contradictory  decisions  can  be  ex-
plained away, and the alternative grounds cited by the Court for many
or all of its decisions  that do, in fact, vindicate  welfare claims  can be
shown to be unsatisfactory. 4  These explanations and showings are too
laborious  to support a  claim that the cases themselves  fully make out
the existence of any constitutional welfare  rights.  Still, the cases  sug-
gest such rights.  The "tension"  among their "rhetoric,  reasoning, and
results,"  as  Professor Tribe puts it, does  "reflect an  unarticulated  per-
ception that there exist constitutional norms establishing minimal enti-
tlements to certain services."25  These cases could be cited in support of
welfare rights should the Court  eventually come to see  them as a  cor-
rect conclusion from accepted forms of legal argument.  The cases hold
a further significance:  they show that and how it is possible for courts
to act on welfare-rights  premises without having to make judgments of
degree for which  no legal standard can be found,  or to take on an un-
manageable  remedial  task,  or  to  arrogate  legislative  and  executive
functions.  The  cases  alone  do  not establish the  welfare-rights  thesis,
but they do go far to answer the first two objections against it-that it is
purely fanciful  and that it thrusts  inappropriate  tasks on the courts.
Let us turn, then, to the next objection on my list-the asserted want
of an adequate basis in law for the welfare-rights thesis.  Welfare-rights
claims,  the  objection  runs,  have  no  warrant  in  legally  admissible
sources construed by legally acceptable methods, as distinguished from,
say, the sources  and methods of moral philosophy or from mere judi-
U.S.  1 (1973)  (public school financing based partly on local taxation of widely disparate tax bases,
leading  to widely disparate per-pupil  expenditures,  not unconstitutional);  Jefferson  v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535  (1972)  (computation  of AFDC payments  at a lesser percentage of "need"  than  used
to compute nonsubsistence  payments to the elderly and the blind not unconstitutional); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405  U.S.  56 (1972)  (summary judicial procedure for eviction  of tenant on ground of rent
default or lease  violation, without allowing landlord's default on  maintenance duties as defense,
not unconstitutional;  one's  interest in  shelter not constitutionally  protected); James  v. Valtierra,
402 U.S.  137  (1971)  (requirement  of special  local referendum  to approve subsidized  housing for
poor families not unconstitutional);  Dandridge v. Williams,  397 U.S.  471 (1970)  (maximum  limit
on per-family welfare grant, regardless of family size, upheld; satisfaction of "most  basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings"  not a constitutionally  protected interest).
23.  See text accompanying notes  130-50  infra (Appendix A).
24.  See text accompanying notes  151-88  infra (Appendix  B).
25.  Tribe,  supra note  2, at  1074.  Professor  Tribe covers  much of the  same ground  as  this
article does at notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text and in the appendices.  See Tribe, supra
note 2, at 1079-85.
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cial  preference.  Because  my  proposition  is  one  about  constitutional
welfare  rights, we can limit the set of admissible sources to the Consti-
tution itself and concentrate  on the question of methods for construing
it.  That, at any rate, is how I intend to proceed, if only because without
treating  the  constitutional  document  itself26  as  in  some  sense  a  first
premise, I see no hope of succeeding in the task of opening minds to the
welfare-rights  thesis.  To  locate  the  rights  in  an  "unwritten  constitu-
tion,"2 7  or otherwise  to deny or repress  the distinction in principle  be-
tween  law and morality, would  accomplish little toward that end.  On
this occasion  then, I intend to proceed  as  a legal positivist, though, as
you must certainly anticipate,  a  free-thinking  one.
For like  reasons  I shall  abstain  from modes of constitutional inter-
pretation  that seem  too  manipulable  to  prove  anything  to  a  welfare-
rights skeptic.  Thus, I shall  have  nothing whatsoever to  do with any
"realist"  notion that the Constitution says whatever the judges make it
say.2'  Less  wholeheartedly,  but dutifully,  I  also  foreswear  any  alle-
giance  to the idea that certain clauses  of the Constitution may be cor-
rectly read to call for legislative and judicial observance of the tenets of
evolving "conventional  morality" or "professed  public ideals."29  By so
proceeding,  one  at least leaves  open the possibility  of satisfying those
who,  like  Professor  Bork,  believe  not  only  that  "a  legitimate  Court
must be controlled by principles exterior to the will of the Justices"3  (a
proposition with which few would take  issue), but also that "system[s]
of moral  and ethical  values"  cannot,  as  such,  have any  "objective  or
intrinsic validity"3'  on which legitimate adjudication can rest.  In short,
what  follows  will  be  (even  if barely)  an  "interpretivist"  argument,  in
the  vocabulary  made  current  by Professors  Grey  and  Ely;  that is,  an
argument that ties its premises into the documentary  Constitution.
Interpretivist  the argument  is, but hardly  literalist or, as  one might
say, contractualist.  The argument  will not  satisfy  anyone who thinks
26.  The "document"  speaks through its "structure"  and "relationships,"  as well as through its
particular  texts.  See generally C.  BLACK,  STRUCTURE  AND  RELATIONSHIP  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW  (1969).
27.  See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,  supra note S.
28.  See, e.g.,  0.  HOLMES,  COLLECTED  LEGAL  PAPERS  168-69  (1920).
29.  See, e.g., Perry,  The Abortion Funding  Cases.- A  Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in
American Government, 66  GEO.  L.J.  1191  (1978);  Wellington,  Common Law  Rules and Constitu-
tional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE  L.J.  221  (1973).
30.  Bork,  Neutral  Principles  and Some First  Amendment Problems,  47  IND.  L.J. 1, 6 (1971).
31.  Id  at  10.
Number 3]
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that judges  overstep the bounds of democratic  consent and legitimacy
by ascribing to the Constitution any right or mandate that would not be
found in it if construed  as  a contract-duly  noting,  of course,  that  it
was entered into  long ago  by parties  who  intended it to  govern their
political relationships for an indefinitely long period.32  The argument
will not try to persuade you away from that contractualist view of con-
stitutional adjudication, should it be yours;33 rather, it will adopt the
most  conservative,  restrained  theory  of transcontractualist  constitu-
tional interpretation I know of-that proposed by Professor John Ely-
and try to make the welfare-rights  case under that  view.
Professor  Ely's  argument  is  available  to  us at  this time  through  a
series of three recent articles.34  It begins, 35 paradoxically, with his con-
sidered rejection, as "impossible,"  of an utterly text-bound approach to
constitutional adjudication,  of an unqualified  "insistence that the work
of the political  branches  is  to  be invalidated  only in  accord  with  an
inference  whose  . . . underlying  premise is fairly  discoverable  in  the
Constitution."36  Ely  takes  this  first  step  despite  his  endorsement  of,
and his observation that the Constitution  itself evidently embodies,  a
democratic  principle  of legitimacy  not  easily  reconcilable  with  free-
form or transtextual review of legislative choices by electorally  nonac-
countable judges.37  Acceptance  of this  seeming paradox  of constitu-
tional interpretation  is forced on Professor  Ely by his conclusion that
strict  text-boundedness  runs into an even  more  serious  contradiction,
one  so  flatly  insoluble  as  to  be  "dispositive":  Interpretivism  means
"proceeding from  premises that  are  . . . in  the document  itself,"  but
"the  document itself, the interpretivist's  Bible,  contains several  provi-
sions whose  invitation to  look  beyond  the  four  corners  of the  docu-
32.  E.g.,  R. BERGER,  GOVERNMENT  BY JUDICIARY  (1977).
33.  For various reasons to reject the contractualist view of constitutional adjudication, see A.
BICKEL, THE  LEAST DANGEROUS  BRANCH  24-26 (1962);  L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 451-55, 564-67,
889-96;  Ely,  Constitutional  Interpretivism:  Its  Allure and  Impossibility,  53  IND.  L.J.  399,  412-45
(1978)  [hereinafter  cited  as Ely,  Constitutional  Interetinism]; Greenawalt,  The  Enduring Signf.
cance of  Neutral  Princples,  78  COLUM.  L.  REV.  982,  1014-16 (1978).
34.  Ely,  Constitutional  Interpretivism,  supra note 33;  Ely,  The  Supreme Court,  1977  Terin-
Foreword-  On  Discovering Fundamental Values,  92 HARV.  L. REV.  5  (1978)  [hereinafter  cited as
Ely, Fundamental  Values]; Ely,  Toward  a  Representation-Reinforcing Mode  ofJudicial  Review,  37
MD.  L. REV.  451 (1978)  [hereinafter cited as Ely, Representation-Reinforcing  JudicialReview]. For
a vigorous disagreement with Ely's argument-especially his readings of history-see Berger, Gov-
ernment  by  Judiciary" John  Hart  Ely's "'Invitation,"  54  IND.  L.J. 277  (1979).
35. Ely,  Constitutional  Interpretivism,  supra note 33.
36.  Id at 400.
37.  Id at 404-11.
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ment-whose invitation.  . . to become a noninterpretivist--cannot  be
construed  away."
38
Professor  Ely then proceeds  to make  his  case  with respect  to  three
provisions of the Constitution:  the ninth amendment, 3 9  and the privi-
leges-or-immunities 4 0  and equal-protection4t  clauses  of the fourteenth
amendment.  Arguing through a combination  of close attention to text,
logical  analysis,  and  historical  gloss,  he  concludes  that  the  ninth
amendment  "was intended  to  signal the existence of federal  constitu-
tional rights beyond those listed elsewhere in the document;' 42 that the
privileges-or-immunities  clause not  only means  "that  there  is a set  of
entitlements that all persons are to get,"  but was intended as "a delega-
tion to future constitutional decision makers to define and protect cer-
tain rights that the document neither lists.  . . nor even in any remotely
specific way gives directions for finding";43 and that "the  equal protec-
tion clause has  to  amount to  . . a general  mandate  to  evaluate the
substantive validity of governmental choices"  by deciding  "which ine-
qualities  are tolerable  under what  circumstances"-a  question whose
answer  "plainly will not  be found  anywhere  in the document  or the
recorded remarks of its writers."'
This  first chapter  of Ely's trilogy ends  where it began-in paradox.
-[E]ven  granting that  [the three clauses]  establish constitutional rights,
they  do  not  readily  lend  themselves  to  principled  judicial  enforce-
ment."  Does not minimum respect  for the democratic principle of le-
gitimacy  then  require  that  the  clauses  "be  treated  as  if they  were
directed exclusively  to the political branches?" 45  "If [an]  approach  to
judicial  enforcement  of [the  three  clauses]  cannot  be  developed  . . .
that is not hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's commitment to rep-
resentative democracy, [one].  . .would have to conclude, whatever the
framers  may  have  been  assuming,  that  the  courts  should  try  to  stay
38.  Id  at 413.
39.  "'The  enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed  to deny or
disparage  others retained by  the people."  U.S. CONST.  amend. IX.
40.  "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United  States  .... "  U.S.  CONST.  amend.  XIV.
41.  "[N]or  [shall any State] deny to any person within its jurisdiction  the equal protection of
the  laws."  Id
42.  Ely,  Constitutional  Interpretiiism, supra note  33,  at 445.
43.  Id  at 426-33.
44.  Id  at 438.
45.  Id  at 447.
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away from  them."46
In the second chapter  of his trilogy47  Professor  Ely rejects  one  ap-
proach-actually,  a family of approaches-advanced  as  a  solution  to
the problem of principled adjudication under the open-ended constitu-
tional  guaranties, that  of judicial  identification  of "fundamental  val-
ues."  Ely reviews the various methods available for this type ofjudicial
inquiry  and concludes  that all are irreconcilable  with the  democratic
principle.  Ely rejects, for reasons familiar enough to need no rehearsal
here, any  approach  that allows a judge  to  "use  his own  values"  as  a
measure of the legality of legislative choice,4" or that advances natural
law  as  an objective  basis  for  transtextual judicial  review.49  Ely  also
observes,  as have Professor Bork and others before him, that "an insis-
tence on 'neutral principles'  does not by itself tell us anything useful
about  the  appropriate  content  of these  principles  or  how  the  Court
should  derive the  values  they  embody."5°  Next  on Ely's list  of false
judicial disciplines is "reason" (in the sense of systematic moral philos-
ophy).  When  highly  reputed  moral  philosophers-e.g.,  Rawls  and
Nozick--cannot  agree  on  "fundamental  values,"  how can judges  ex-
cept by personal  and subjective  bias or inclination  choose  among  the
divergent  conclusions toward  which their theories respectively  lead?5'
"Tradition,"  Ely  says,  "is  not a  satisfactory answer  for  a  democratic
policy  because  it  leads  to  "the  proposition  that  yesterday's  majority
should control today's."52  "Consensus"-implying a judicial search for
"conventional morality"-is no better for Ely, because he finds  it odd
to think that judicial search is a better method for finding morality than
simply observing  the outputs of democratically  organized  legislatures,
and because "it simply makes no sense to employ the value judgments
of the majority  as the vehicle for protecting minorities  from the value
judgments of the majority."53
Certain reservations  about Professor Ely's critique of "fundamental
values"  as a possible guide in constitutional adjudication may, for pres-
46.  Id  at 448.
47.  Ely, Fundamental  Values, supra note 34.
48.  See id  at 16-22.
49.  See id  at 22-32.
50.  Id  at 33.  But see Greenawalt,  supra note 33.
51.  Ely, Fundamental  Values, supra note 34, at 37-38.
52.  Id  at 42.
53.  Id  at 52.
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ent purposes, be set aside.54  One reservation, however,  requires com-
ment.  That  a judge  cannot  properly  proceed  by  simply  choosing
among competing philosophical theories or systems must, of course, be
accepted;  but not (if, indeed,  Professor  Ely means  to  go this far) that
the literature  of moral philosophy is irrelevant to proper performance
of the judge's  task.  As we  shall see,  Ely himself believes  that judges
must begin  a process of normative  reasoning from a premise emergent
from, if not exactly in, the historical  Constitution.  There is no reason
why judges may not call upon the methods and contents of the philo-
sophical literature to inform and clarify that reasoning process once its
constitutionally  connected  premise  is in place.
That gets us to the capstone of Ely's trilogy in which  he offers, as a
solution for the problem developed in the first chapter, a kind of "ulti-
mate interpretivism," based on the notion of "representation-reinforce-
ment"  as  a  pervasive  constitutional  value.  Ely's  argument,  you  will
recall, had left the judges immobilized  between  two faces of interpre-
tivist methodology-between  the demand  for judicial  abstinence from
extra-constitutional dictation of values to the political branches and the
demand  for loyalty to the explicit constitutional  text, including its ap-
parent mandate upon the government to respect certain values or inter-
ests left for future  definition.  The contradiction  cannot be denied, but
perhaps it can be superseded by moving to a yet more abstract plane of
constitutional  interpretation,  which  takes  as  its  premise  an  implicit
value or purpose thought  to underlie and pervade the whole constitu-
tional  scheme-that  of political participation  through representation.
This value, as Ely portrays it, is one of "process  writ large-[ofl  en-
suring  broad  participation  in  the  processes  and  benefits  of  govern-
ment." 5  The textual content of the Constitution, its historical setting,
and judicial understanding of its  purposes since its adoption, all com-
bine  to provide a constraining and democratically  legitimating  ration-
ale for judges  in performing  their task of "supplying  content"56  to the
54.  With  respect  to  "consensus,"  for example,  Ely  perhaps  gives too little  attention  to  the
possibility of a relevant  and judicially  detectible gap  between  day-to-day political  behavior and
"professed public ideals."  Perry, supra note 29, at  1215,  1225-31; see Michelman,  Welfare Rights,
supra note 1, at  1004-10.  Similarly, Ely's dead-hand characterization of "tradition" seems insensi-
n've to the possibility that tradition offers an extrapolable trajectory  for evolutionary  change.  See
Tribe,  Wm st"  Not to Think About Plastic  Trees- New Foundationsfor  Environmental  Law, 83 YALE
L J. 1315  (1974).
55.  Ely, Representation-Reinforcing  Judicial  Review, supra note 34, at 470.
56,  Id
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open-ended  guaranties  of  the  ninth  and  fourteenth  amendments:
judges  should "focus not on whether  this or that  substantive value  is
unusually important or fundamental, but rather on whether the oppor-
tunity to participate,  either in the political  processes by which  values
are appropriately  identified and accommodated  or in the accommoda-
tion those processes have reached,  has been  unduly  constricted"57  by
the challenged  state or governmental  conduct.
For full understanding  of Professor  Ely's  representation-reinforce-
ment  thesis  and full  appreciation  of its  bearing  on the  welfare-rights
thesis,  one must take careful note that he speaks  of the  Constitution's
pervasive purpose of ensuring participation not only in procedures, but
in outcomes; not only in "the  political process,"  but in the "benefits"
and "accommodations"  the process yields.  Representation  and partici-
pation hold a  substantive  as well  as a formal  dimension  for Professor
Ely.  But, given that he (of course)  does not believe that the  Constitu-
tion generally calls for an equal distribution of the benefits  of govern-
mental  action,  how  does  he  think  judges  are  to  distinguish  those
occasions on which uneven distribution offends the pervasive participa-
tion value, without lapsing into the impermissibly  subjective search for
"fundamental"  interests?
We can anticipate the form that the answer must take:  it is true of
some, but not all, interests affected by government activity that one has
these interests simply by virtue of being a person in a republican polity.
Deprived of adequate service to those interests,  a person cannot  func-
tion in the roles and relationships  contemplated for individuals by the
political conception of representative democracy.  Assuring "broad par-
ticipation"  in the fulfillment of those interests thus will be specifically
"representation-reinforcing"  in Professor  Ely's intended sense.  (Here,
we  might note how recourse  to  the philosophical  literature  can  assist
with the logical development  of argument from legally derived  prem-
ises.  Ely  implicitly seems to  rely upon an idea closely  akin to  that of
"social primary goods," which plays a central role in John Rawls' phi-
losophy of social justice.5 8)
To sharpen and clarify this idea further, we need to review briefly the
reasoning by which Ely works up the idea of participation as a perva-
sive constitutional value.  The key is his portrayal of what he calls "the
57.  Id  at 456.
58.  See generally J. RAWLS,  A  THEORY OF  JUSTICE  62, 92-93  (1971).
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American  concept  of representative  democracy."59  This  concept  he
sharply  distinguishes  from the  latter-day vision  of interest-group  plu-
ralism, in which political society  is viewed as a collection of numerous,
partially  overlapping,  narrowly  particularistic  interest  groups--each
contending against all the others for the largest possible payoff from the
majoritarian legislative process,  each  conceding some payoff to others
in  the  course  of forming  ad  hoc  political  coalitions,  and  each  thus
emerging  over the long run with its vital interests  protected and a de-
cent share of the surplus benefits.6"
Embodied in the original Constitution, claims Ely, was  a very differ-
ent  idea  about  how  representation,  majority  rule,  separated  powers,
and federalism would work to accord roughly equal service to the inter-
ests of each  person.  (It  is,  to be  sure,  an idea that our generation  is
prone to regard as "idealistic,"  but one that would come more naturally
to generations closer to the influence  of Locke and Rousseau, who for
this purpose can  be yoked  together.6")  This idea rests  on the supposi-
tion that the interests of each individual pretty  much coincide with the
interests of all, because the people comprise "an essentially homogene-
ous  group whose  interests  [do]  not  vary  significantly. '62  This  essen-
tially  homogeneous  populace  will  naturally  "choose  representatives
whose  interests  [intertwine]  with  theirs,"63  the representative  majority
will  "govern  in the interest  of the whole  people,"  and the result  will
satisfy the framers' commitment to the idea that "every citizen [is]  enti-
tled  to equivalent respect."'
The framers  understood, according to Ely, that their society was not
perfectly  homogeneous and that some constitutional safeguards, in ad-
dition to  electoral  accountability  and majority  rule, were  required  to
ensure that some interests  did not dominate or that some would not be
unfairly subordinated.  The Bill of Rights and the scheme of separated,
divided, and countervailing  powers were designed to meet this need.
59.  Ely,  Representation-Reinforcing  Judicial  Review, supra note 34,  at 456,  471.
60.  See, e.g.,  R.  DAHL,  A  PREFACE  TO  DEMOCRATIC  THEORY  (1956).
61.  See, e.g.,  K.  ARROW,  SOCIAL  CHOICE  AND  INDIVIDUAL  VALUES  81-86  (2d  ed.  1963)
i"Ldealist"  view of majoritarian  procedures).  On  Locke's  understanding of majoritarianism,  see
W.  KENDALL,  JOHN  LOCKE  AND THE  DOCTRINE  OF  MAJORITY-RULE  (1941).
62.  Ely,  Representation-Reinforcing  Judicial  Review, supra note 34, at 459.
63.  Id  at 457.
64.  Id  at 458.  Again, we  catch a whiff of philosophy.  See R. DWORKIN,  supra note 8,  at
S  0-82, 273-75  (fundamental  liberal principle of "equal  concern and respect").
65.  See Ely,  Representation-Reinforcing  Judicial  Review, supra note 34, at 459-60.
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These devices, however, turned out insufficient to the task.  There arose
or persisted in American society differences  in economic and social sta-
tus, power, and interest sharper and stabler than the original protective
devices could master.  Americans  learned that the interests of conven-
tionally  identifiable, weak,  or stigmatized  groups  might  be systemati-
cally  disregarded.  "[A]  frontal  assault  on  the  problem  of majority
tyranny was needed.  The existing theory  of representation  had  to  be
extended so as not simply to  ensure that the representative would not
sever his interests from those of a majority of his constituency, but also
to ensure that he would not sever a majority coalition's interests  from
those of various minorities. 66
To  some  extent,  Ely  notes,  the  Supreme  Court  could  provide  the
needed extension  by construing  and applying the supremacy  clause,67
the commerce clause,6 8  and the privileges-or-immunities  clause of arti-
cle four69 to protect at least one of the obvious victim classes-out-of-
staters-against state legislative insensitivity to their interests.  By disal-
lowing legislation that treats out-of-staters  as  a class apart,  the  Court
could tie their interests to those of voting  constituents  so  as to achieve
"virtual representation."  All too plainly, this device would do nothing
for blacks  or comparably  powerless  and  effectively  underrepresented
groups.  Ely argues that a disciplined  and responsible  approach to the
problem of adjudication under the fourteenth  amendment  equal-pro-
tection  and privileges-or-immunities  guaranties  would respond  to this
perception of gaps and failures in the original constitutional scheme of
representation  designed  to  ensure  "broad  participation"  in  both
processes and benefits.
This ultimate democratic aim of "broad participation"  is Ely's key to
reconciling  "what are often characterized  as two conflicting American
ideals-the protection of majority rule on the one hand, and the protec-
tion  of minorities  from  denials  of equal  concern  and  respect  on  the
other."70  Majority rule itself was originally supposed to assure "equal
concern and respect" for each person.  "Protection of minorities" was a
secondary  problem that arose  only in response to  the perception  that
there are minorities-well-defined,  easily identified, ill-supplied groups
66.  Id  at 462.
67.  See id at 467-68.
68.  See id at 465-66.
69.  See id at 465.
70.  Id  at 469.
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of people-who bear a special risk of effective exclusion from the give-
and-take  of pluralistic majoritarian  politics.
Professor  Ely's  published  work7'  has  not yet  reached  the point  of
telling  us in  any detail which  rights he believes  a representation-rein-
forcing court can properly "define and protect" as constitutionally safe-
guarded  privileges  and  immunities,72  or "which  inequalities"  a  court
ought to "find  [in]tolerable [and thus denials of equal protection] under
what circumstances."73  We can, however, gather a rough anticipation
of his views both from his citation to the work of the Warren Court as a
model  of the representation-reinforcing  mode  of judicial  review  and
from  his  explanations  of the  representation-reinforcing  properties  of
certain constitutional  texts.
Ely plainly  has  uppermost  in  mind Warren  Court  decisions  in the
fields  of voting  rights and racial discrimination.  The Constitution no-
where  mentions74  state  voter  qualifications,75  distribution  of  voting
power,76 and ballot access,77  but decisions regarding these matters most
obviously  exemplify  the  kind of review  Professor  Ely considers  to be
justified by the standard of representation-reinforcement.  The Warren
Court,  according  to  Ely's  theory, properly  found  that  malapportion-
ment denies equal protection and unequal ballot access infringes upon
a constitutionally protected  privilege (as Ely presumably would have it)
not  by textual  exegesis  and related  inference,  but by imputing to  the
open-ended  clauses the pervasive constitutional aim of "broad partici-
pation."  As to racial discrimination cases, Ely means,  I think, to focus
on the Warren Court's sensitivity to social and institutional factors that
necessitate  more judicial  protection  for the descendants  of the  slaves
than the mere invalidation of explicit racial classifications in statutes, in
order to provide effective  assurance of participation on terms of equal
respect and concern.7"  The judicial doctrine  of "badges  and incidents
71.  See notes 33-34  supra.
72.  See note 43  wupra and  accompanying text.
73.  See note 44 supra and accompanying  text.
74.  Cf  U.S.  CONST.  art.  I,  § 2.  r 2  (sets forth  qualifications  for membership  in House  of
Represcntatives);  id  § 4,  1 (Congress  may  alter  state-created  regulations  of time, place,  and
manner of choosing Senators  and  Representatives).
75.  Eg.,  Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,  395  U.S. 621 (1969);  Harper v. Virginia Bd.  of
Elections, 383  U.S. 663  (1966);  Carrington  v. Rash, 380 U.S.  89 (1965).
76.  Eg.,  Reynolds v. Sims, 377  U.S.  533  (1964);  Gray  v. Sanders, 372 U.S.  368  (1963).
77.  E.g.,  Williams  v. Rhodes,  393  U.S. 23  (1968).
7,;.  See. e.g.,  Reitman  v.  Mulkey,  387  U.S.  369  (1967);  Whitus  v.  Georgia,  385  U.S.  545
(1967);  Anderson  v.  Martin,  375  U.S.  399 (1964).  Cf. Hunter  v. Erickson,  393  U.S.  385  (1969)
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of slavery" 79 and the Myrdal vicious-circle notion with which that doc-
trine  connects8°  are thoroughly  congenial  to  the entire  drift of Ely's
argument.  Any doubt would be dispelled  by Ely's selection  of the "ti-
tles-of-nobility" clause--of all things!-as an illustration of a represen-
tation-reinforcing  constitutional  text:  "The  prohibition  against
granting titles of nobility seems rather plainly to have been designed to
buttress  the democratic ideal that all are equals  in government."8 '
Having hitched  our wagon to  Ely's star, we have now  reached  this
position:  the Constitution itself commands  recognition of transtextual
rights not only by the political branches in the first instance, but  also
(as  usual) by  the judiciary  in case  of legislative  or executive  default,
provided  only  that  a  "principled  ...approach  to  judicial  enforce-
ment"  can be found, one not "hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's
commitment to representative democracy"  as directly expressed  by the
Constitution taken as a whole.82  One  seeks,  then, a limiting and con-
straining criterion-a premise for argument aimed at distinguishing be-
tween  false  and  true  transtextual  claims-that  is itself rooted  in the
animating constitutional idea of representative democracy.  "Represen-
tation-reinforcement"  or "broad participation"  is just such a criterion.
Ergo,  the judiciary must recognize  and enforce  rights singled  out  on
the basis of that criterion.  So argues Ely.
Suppose  that we think  of cases  governed by rights  as  appearing  in
classes or families--each  class having an easily identified  and  agreed-
upon  core,  but  an  indistinct  or  contestable  margin.  Cases  spread
around  those cores  more-or-less  close  to  them,  and  the margins  that
separate cases  governed by a right  from those  beyond it are as  circles
with cores  at their  centers.  Its agreed-upon  core  gives  each  class  an
identity  and  character  that allows  for intelligible  dispute  about hard
marginal  cases-a dispute  that can reduce  the area of marginal disa-
greement to a narrow band, if not to a sharp line.
The class of representation-reinforcing  rights that Ely wants to iden-
tify seems to have  a double core (twin foci,  as it were),  around which
the included cases spread in an elliptical shape.  One focus is protection
(Ohio ordinance requiring  majority approval of voters to enact any law that regulates real estate
sales on basis of race, religion, or national origin unconstitutional);  Loving v.  Virginia, 388 U.S.  1
(1967)  (Virginia  statute prohibiting interracial  marriages  unconstitutional).
79.  See Jones  v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,  392 U.S. 409  (1968).
80.  See  I G.  MYRDAL,  AN  AMERICAN  DILEMMA  75-76  (1944).
81.  Ely, Representation-Reinforcing  Judicial  Review, supra note  34,  at 474.
82.  See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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for access on an equal footing to political acts and activities in the nar-
row sense of voting and standing for office.  The other focus is protec-
tion  against  stigmatizing  discriminations  in  treatment  that  reflect,
reinforce, or facilitate systematic bias against one's group in the group-
oriented, majoritarian  political process.83  Cases close to both cores, or
foci,  will lie near the center of the ellipse, well within the boundary  of
the  representation-reinforcing  class  of  rights.  Other  cases  will  fall
outside the central area, but still within the class near one of the elon-
gated ends of the ellipse.  Thus, the case of a poll tax historically  used
with  the  purpose  and  effect  of  excluding  black  citizens  from  the
franchise,  or the case  of a  municipal boundary adjustment  or at-large
voting  system  deployed  with like  effect  and evident  purpose,  will  lie
near  the center;"4  but  a  "crazy-quilt"  malapportionment  also  will  be
covered by virtue of proximity to the equal-political-footing  core,  even
though class discrimination  is  not directly involved,"  and segregation
of bathrooms and golf courses will be covered by virtue of proximity to
the class-discrimination  core,  even though  political activity  is not  di-
rectly implicated.86
To think of representation-reinforcing  rights as comprising one class
rather  than  two partially  overlapping  ones  is simply  to  recognize  the
practical dynamics  that often, though not always, obtain from stigma-
tizing discriminations or deprivations and political ineffectuality, recip-
rocally connecting  one phenomenon with the other.  Maldistribution  of
formal  political  power obviously  removes  or weakens  a basic institu-
tional  safeguard  against  systematic  maldistribution  of status  and  the
resources  that support  it.  Conversely,  and perhaps  more importantly,
inequalities of resources  and statuses,  especially insofar  as visibly cor-
related  with salient  group  identification,  almost certainly  constitute  a
fundamental  condition and cause of systematic bias in the functioning
of majoritarian political institutions.  A world in which racial minority
groups are not noticeably differentiated  from the majority in terms of
social role or material conditions of life almost certainly will be a polit-
ically safer world for those minorities.  These relationships between p0-
83.  Cf Fiss,  Groups and  the Equal Protection  Clause, 5  PHILOSOPHY  PUB.  AFF.  107  (1976)
(antidiscrimination  principle  is  one  of several  "mediating"  principles  that  stand  between  the
courts and their interpretation  of the Constitution).
84.  See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973);  Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663  (1966);  Gomillion v.  Lightfoot, 364  U.S.  339  (1960).
85.  See Baker v. Carr, 369  U.S.  186  (1962).
86.  See, e.g.,  Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S.  879  (1955)  (per curiam).
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litical  efficacy  and  group  socioeconomic  status  will enter  into  the
argument  now  to be  offered  for identifying  welfare  rights  as  among
those transtextual rights that ought to be judicially recognized as repre-
sentation-reinforcing  privileges  or  immunities,  or as  the negatives  of
representation-defeating  inequalities,  under  Ely's  quasi-interpretivist
view of the fourteenth  amendment.
Consider for a moment the following assortment of transtextual con-
stitutional rights that  actually have  been  recognized  and enforced  by
the Supreme Court:  to bear or not bear children  as  one chooses;87  to
raise and educate one's children as one chooses;8 8  to choose freely one's
marital status and partner; 9 to live as an "extended" rather than a "nu-
clear" family; 9   to remain at liberty if not guilty of crime or a threat to
anyone's physical safety, even though a genuine annoyance  to others;9'
to travel outside the United  States;92 to migrate and resettle within the
United States; 93 and to decline participation in patriotic observances.94
Should any  or  all of these be properly  regarded  as  representation-
reinforcing rights?  Each can certainly be viewed as a "political"  right,
protecting  choices  that  when  exercised  can  fairly  be  called  political
acts-setting up  or nurturing  what  Ely  calls  "competing  power  cen-
ters," 95  expressing  or actualizing values  that may or may  not be con-
ventional ones, raising consciousnesses, "voting with one's feet," and so
on.96  Although  political  in  the  broad  sense,  however,  these  acts  in
themselves do not amount to participation-as do acts of voting, candi-
dacy, officeholding,  and legislative lobbying and debate-in represen-
tative  democracy, the political system  of last resort envisioned by the
Constitution.  Nor do  the liberties  of family  choice,  child-rearing,  or
travel  directly  enable, enhance,  or condition  effective  participation  in
that political  system.  To  regard  them  as  constitutionally  guaranteed
87.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.  113  (1973).
88.  See, e.g.,  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205  (1972);  Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268  U.S.
510 (1925).
89.  See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401  U.S. 371  (1970);  Loving v. Virginia, 388  U.S.  1 (1967).
90.  See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431  U.S.  494 (1977).
91.  See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563  (1975).
92.  See Kent v.  Dulles, 357  U.S.  116  (1958).
93.  See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
94.  See Wooley v. Maynard,  430 U.S. 705  (1977);  West  Virginia  v. Barnette,  319  U.S.  624
(1943).
95.  See Ely, Representation-Reinforcing  Judicial  Review, supra note 34,  at 475.
96.  See generally Heymann  & Bar'zelay,  The Forest and  the Trees:  Roe v. Wade andits Crit-
ics, 53 B.U.L. REv.  765  (1973).
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under the rubric of representation-reinforcement  would leave that cri-
terion  virtually  boundless,  lacking  the constraining  force  on judicial
judgment apparently required  by the idea of representative democracy
itself.  If they are proper constitutional  rights-a conclusion  I  am  far
from  wishing  to  deny-their  sources  are  unwritten  ones  beyond  the
purview of this discussion.
Now contrast those liberties with a person's  interest in basic educa-
tion.  Without  basic education-without the literacy,  fluency,  and ele-
mentary understanding  of politics and markets that are hard to obtain
without it-what hope is  there of effective participation in the last-re-
sort political  system?  On just this basis,  it seems,  the Supreme  Court
itself has expressly  allowed that "some identifiable quantum  of educa-
tion"  may  be a constitutional  right.97  But if so, then what  about life
itself, health and vigor, presentable attire, or shelter not  only from the
elements  but from the physical and psychological  onslaughts of social
debilitation?  Are not these interests the universal, rock-bottom prereq-
uisites  of effective  participation  in  democratic  representation-even
paramount in importance to education and, certainly, to the niceties of
apportionment, districting,  and ballot access on which so much judicial
and scholarly labor has been  lavished? 98  How can  there be those  so-
phisticated  rights to  a formally unbiased  majoritarian  system,  but no
rights to the indispensable  means of effective participation in that sys-
tem?  How  can the  Supreme  Court  admit the possibility of a  right to
minimum  education,  but go out of its way to  deny  flatly any right to
subsistence, shelter, or health care?99
Some may object that I am guilty of confusing the existence or pos-
session of a right with the worth of the right or the  capacity to derive
value from it."°  The right to travel, or publish, or worship, connotes a
freedom to do what one has the means to do, not a social undertaking
to provide the means.  So it must be with rights of democratic partici-
pation, no?  Well,  no.  Rights of democratic  participation  differ from
other rights precisely in that they are  rights of last resort, ones that, in
97.  San Antonio Independent  School Dist. v.  Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  1, 36  (1973).
98.  E.g.,  R.  DIXON,  DEMOCRATIC  REPRESENTATION:  REAPPORTIONMENT  IN  LAW  AND
POLITICS  (1968).
99.  See Maher v.  Roe, 432  U.S. 464,  469  (1977)  (dictum) (no constitutional  right to  health
care):  note 23 supra; text accompanying  notes 130-88  infra (appendices).
100.  Cf. J. RAWLS,  supra note 58, at 204 (distinguishing liberty from the worth of liberty).  See
also C. FRIED,  supra note 7, at  110-11.
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the Supreme Court's words, are "preservative  of all rights."''  In Pro-
fessor Ely's words,  they provide a  guarantee against  "undue  constric-
tion" of "the opportunity to participate.  . . in the political process  by
which values are appropriately identified and accommodated,"  includ-
ing-and  this  is crucial--"values"  that pertain  to  the  distribution  in
society of the means of enjoying rights.  One might as well say to those
who  are underrepresented  in a malapportioned  legislature  that  their
remedy lies through legislative politics,' 0 2 as say to those who lack ac-
cess to "the basic necessities of life" that their right of democratic par-
ticipation is not constricted.
If we  now  let  our  focus  shift from the  political-action  core  to  the
status-harm 0 3  core  of representation-reinforcement,  we  find  that  the
argument  for welfare  rights,  as  a part  of constitutionally  guaranteed
democratic representation,  gains in richness and power.  To be hungry,
afflicted,  ill-educated,  enervated,  and  demoralized  by  one's  material
circumstances  of life is not only to be personally disadvantaged in com-
petitive politics, but also, quite possibly, to be identified as a member of
a group--call it "the poor"-that has both some characteristic  political
aims and values and some vulnerability to having its natural  force of
numbers systematically subordinated in the processes of political influ-
ence and majoritarian coalition-building.  Even if there is no group of
"the poor" for which that description  holds, it is a  blatant fact of na-
tional-including  constitutional-history  that  there  are  groups  for
which it has held and does hold.  It is also a fact-one that can hardly
be accepted  as accidental-that being a member of, say, the black mi-
nority significantly correlates with one's chances of being severely im-
poverished  and,  therefore,  of carrying  marks  of poverty  that  both
motivate  and  facilitate political  and social  bias.  Satisfaction  of basic
welfare  interests thus  seems  to  be a  crucial  ingredient  of any serious
attempt to eliminate the vestiges of slavery from the system of demo-
cratic  representation.  The  Supreme  Court  was  right  on  the mark  in
Goldberg v. Kelly:  "[W]elfare.  . . can help bring within reach  of the
poor the same opportunities that are  available to others  to participate
meaningfully in the life of the community.  . . .Public assistance, then,
is not mere charity, but a means to 'procure the Blessings of Liberty to
101.  Harper v. Virginia  Bd. of Elections, 383  U.S. 663,  667 (1966)  (quoting Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins,  118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
102.  See Baker v. Carr, 369  U.S.  186, 251,  258-59  (1962)  (Clark, J.,  concurring).
103.  The notion of "status harm"  is developed  in  Fiss, supra note  83.
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ourselves  and our Posterity.'  ",o
Let  me  now pause to  summarize.  First,  courts can  accord  recogni-
tion to minimum welfare rights in ways that have a practical bearing on
adjudication but do not raise judicially inappropriate  questions of defi-
nition or problems of enforcement.  Second,  legal argument  does exist
for judicial  recognition of minimum welfare rights as a direct implica-
tion of the written Constitution;  indeed, it seems to be a stronger  and
clearer  constitutionally  based  argument  than  can  be  found  for  a
number of presently  recognized constitutional rights.  If in making this
latter point I  have belabored  the obvious, it is only because I want you
to  share  with  me  the  sense of queerness  and  paradox  suffusing  this
whole  discussion:  the  queerness,  on the  one hand,  of there being  so
much trouble about admitting that everyone has a right to the means of
subsistence at a minimum social standard of decency;  and the paradox,
on the other, of even  thinking  to cast the question in the language of
rights or even considering the matter as meet for legal disputation.  It is
a funny feeling repeatedly echoed by the Supreme  Court of the 1970's:
"The administration of public welfare assistance.  . . involves the most
basic  economic  needs  of impoverished  human beings,"  but the ques-
tions it raises are questions of "wise economic or social policy,"  not of
right." 5  "We  do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and san-
itary housing.  But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies
for every social and economic  ill." 1°6  "We  are in complete  agreement
. . .that 'the grave significance of education both to the individual and
our  society'  cannot be doubted.  But the importance  of a service...
does  not determine  whether  it must  be  regarded  as  [constitutionally]
fundamental."'
1 0 7
Granting that importance is not determinative, is it not highly signifi-
cant?  Obviously, the importance  of a  service  in  itself does not deter-
mine  constitutional  entitlement  to  it,  precisely  because  it  is
constitutional  entitlement that is in issue:  No constitution, no constitu-
tional right.  But once it is allowed that there are some-any-constitu-
tional rights beyond those literally spelled out in the constitutional text
104.  Goldberg  v. Kelly,  397  U.S.  254,  265  (1970).  Here,  again, the  argument  from a legally
derived  premise may find guidance and enrichment  in the philosophical literature;  specifically,  in
Rawls'  notion of the social bases of self-respect  as chief among the social primary goods.  See J.
RAWLS,  %upra  note 58,  at 440; Michelman,  We/fare Rights, supra note  1, at 983.
105.  Dandridge  v. Williams, 397  U.S. 471,  485-86  (1970).
106.  Lindsey v.  Normet, 405 U.S.  56, 74 (1972).
107.  San Antonio Independent  School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411  U.S.  1, 30 (1973).
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or rigorously  deducible from it, then importance just has to become a
crucial constitutional variable.  This is true partly because interests and
claims often conflict or, in other words, rights entail costs, and the sig-
nificant  must take  precedence  over the petty.  It is  true also  because
some rights presuppose others, and some rights, even if not all, presup-
pose one's having passed beyond the struggle for existence and for the
marks of minimum social respect.  That is just a simple matter of mun-
dane observation.
Now, if the importance of welfare claims, or the importance of their
importance to the question of whether they are rights, is so clear at the
level of mundane observation, it must be that the trouble about welfare
rights  arises  not at that  level, but at  the level  of moral and political
speculation, or theory, or (please excuse my mention of it) philosophy.
The trouble we share about welfare rights seems to be evidence of what
some assert1 0 8 and others doubt or deny'09 is an  inevitable connection
between legal (especially constitutional) reason and speculative or phil-
osophical reflection  about matters  of ethics  and politics.  It seems,  in
short, that the trouble we have with welfare rights  as legal claims is a
direct counterpart  of the doubts  these rights engender  in a  certain  so-
phisticated  scheme of political philosophizing that is widely, if hazily,
shared among the educated and  reflective public, most or all of us to
some degree included.
I can  undertake  here  only  the  sketchiest  indication  of  a  possible
source  of the trouble  and how  it might  be  overcome.  A  root  of the
difficulty, I suggest, is the way we habitually understand and respond to
the idea  of preinstitutional, "natural"  rights-the idea that some enti-
tlements stem directly from an adequate conception of what it is to be a
human person and, therefore,  must be recognized by any  society  that
aspires not to be monstrous.
That habitual conception displays three significant features.  First, a
right is understood to be a claim one has against some person (or per-
sons), not against  the cosmos or the nature  of things; in other  words,
rights entail duties and duties are owed by persons.  Second, par  excel-
lence, rights  and their entailed  duties  are finite,  reciprocal,  and,  con-
comitantly, negative in character.  Persons are bound to one another by
108.  Eg.,  B.  ACKERMAN,  PRIVATE  PROPERTY  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION  5  (1977);  R.  DWOR-
KIN,  supra note  8,  at 131-49;  D.  RICHARDS,  THE MORAL  CRITICISM  OF  LAW  ch.  III  (1977);  see
Bayles, Morality and  the Constitution, 1978  ARIZ.  ST.  L.J. 561.
109.  Eg.,  Bork, supra  note 30,  at  10;  Monaghan,  supra note  4, at  120  n.18.
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an equal, mutual, and finite duty not to encroach actively on a standard
zone of personal interest and liberty that each enjoys by right.  Positive
rights, including welfare rights, pose problems largely because the reci-
procity and boundedness of duties seem gravely threatened by the idea
of being duty-bound to  contribute  actively to the satisfaction  of other
people's interest or needs.  Needs are neither equal, nor reciprocal, nor
quite  finite.  They  are  to  some  extent  unilaterally  controllable,  inas-
much  as one's needs  may be  traceable  to one's prior choices,  but the
resource requirements  of satisfying them  may be virtually limitless."'
Third, the state's functions, par  excellence, are  first, to vindicate rights
by  preventing, requiting,  and punishing  violations of duties,  and  sec-
ond, to  facilitate satisfaction of other interests  and needs-themselves
not rights-by  regulatory  and  service  activities.  The  state  is an  en-
forcer, but not a bearer of duties (save the duty of enforcement)."'t  Its
emergence  does not ipso facto  call  into existence  any new rights.
Please  bear in  mind  that  what  I mean  to  sketch  here  is  an  accus-
tomed way of conceiving not the class of rights in toto, but the subclass
of preinstitutional  or, in  Ronald  Dworkin's terminology,  background
rights-in short, widely held  intuitions of inherent personal rights that
might claim legitimate, or at least comfortable,  expression in transtex-
tual constitutional adjudication.  I do not mean, and it is not the case,
that the notion of positive rights is beyond our ken.  We readily recog-
nize  these  rights  and  normally  expect judicial  enforcement  of them,
when specifically  and deliberately  fashioned in contracts, legislation,  or
constitutions." 2  The  features of nonreciprocity  and potential bound-
lessness, which make positive rights seem problematic when considered
as  a  priori claims  that condition the workings  of institutions,  are not
especially  troubling  when  rights  are  considered  as  the  end  results of
institutional deliberation and specification.
Of all  the  writings  that  treat  conscientiously  the  idea  of positive
rights  to provision for basic needs, none  have been  more insistent on
the  problems  of voracity  and  nonreciprocity  than  those  of Charles
Fried." 3  Yet remarkably  (if unintentionally) the implications  of Pro-
110.  See genera/l' C.  FRIED, supra note 7,  at  108-31.
111.  Even Nozick concedes the  duty  of protection.  See R. NozICK,  ANARCHY,  STATE  AND
UrOPIA, 112-13 (1974).
112.  See C.  FRIED, supra note  7,  at  110.
113.  Id  See also Fried,  Equalinv and Rights in Medical Care, in IMPLICATIONS  OF  GUARAN-
IEEING  MEDICAL  CARE  (J.  Perpich ed.  1976).
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fessor Fried's argument ultimately harmonize with those  I have high-
lighted  in  Professor  Ely's  trilogy.  Exposing  those  implications  will
incidentally answer the remaining  objection to the welfare-rights  the-
sis-that its recognition would ill-serve the interests of its contemplated
beneficiaries.
Fried's sensitivity  to  the  dangers  of enslavement  to  other people's
needs does not deafen him to the justice of claims to have one's needs
met.  He explicitly states that "the situation of our fellow men makes an
affirmative  claim  upon  us,  and that  claim  supports  an  argument  for
positive rights."" 4  He recounts sympathetically the argument that "the
[basic] needs of our fellow citizens.  . . make a peculiarly urgent claim
upon us.  . . for the deeper reason that they relate to the development
and the maintenance  of the moral capacities of freedom  and rational-
ity."' 5  He goes on to  observe that  "we must maintain life and some
modicum of vigor if these capacities are to persist.  . . . And the capac-
ities for reason and for free, moral action  cannot be taken for granted
even when physical survival is assured.  For these capacities to be pres-
ent, the human animal requires  certain  conditions  of nurture  and in-
struction.  . . . It  also  seems  that  minimal  conditions  of  care  and
affection are necessary if a capacity to relate to other human beings is
to develop.""' 6  He  offers  us,  in short,  an  eloquent  Kantian  brief for
welfare  rights-one firmly grounded  in the imperative  to respect  and
safeguard  "the integrity of [each]  person as a freely choosing entity."'"17
Fried's  own brief, however, falls  short of overcoming his  concerns
about voracity and nonreciprocity-in  other words, about the rights of
those required  to contribute towards satisfaction  of the basic needs of
others.  His solution to the dilemma is to recognize a positive right, but
not a welfare right.  "The basic, the primary positive right is a right to
a fair share of money income-that  is, to a fair share of the commu-
nity's scarce  resources.""' 8  Assured  of that income,  persons  can  look
out for their own basic needs by voluntary risk-pooling-buying  insur-
ance (if and as they choose) against eventualities of needs so unusually
expensive that the fair share cash flow will not cover them."19  As Fried
114.  C. FRIED, supra note 7, at  119.
115.  Id  at  120.
116.  Id  at  120-21.
117.  Id  at  109.
118.  Id  at  128.
119.  See id  at  126-28.
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points out, this approach,  in  addition to  its merit  as a  solution  to the
problem  posed  by  voracious  needs,  has  another  advantage  over
schemes  for  in-kind  provisions:  it has  "the  virtue  of recognizing  the
principle  of autonomy";  that  is,  of leaving  individuals  to  define  for
themselves  their needs  and  priorities.
Yet the fair shares-insurance  solution  is  fatally incomplete  for rea-
sons of which  Fried  is expressly  aware,  though he fails to trace com-
pletely their implications.  Fried knows, at any rate, that "the insurance
model works well  only because we have made the crucial assumption
that the distribution of income  is fair."  If that assumption is  false, or
even  irreducibly controversial,  "there  may be little else to do but pro-
vide  for necessities  in  kind."'20  That  is  a  point with  which  I  agree;
indeed, I have made it elsewhere in my own way. 21  But it is too paltry
a concession  to the  problem  of the controversiality  of the fair-shares
question.  Fried himself demurs, at least for the time being, to the ques-
tion of choice  among  competing  principles  of distributive justice. 22
More  significant,  however,  is  his apparent  view that  the choice  of a
principle is inevitably inseparable from the choice  of a political consti-
tution  and,  even  more  tellingly,  is  inextricable  from  constitutionally
sponsored political activity.  "Fair shares,"  Fried writes, "emerge from
just political institutions and usually represent reasonable compromises
between opposing views.  Thus, political rights are involved in this in-
stitutional  complex  and their  recognition  is  necessary  to  validate  the
justice  of the scheme  determining  fair shares."'123
In Fried's view, political rights are an a fortiori entailment of a more
expansive, Kantian conception  of rights, including the positive right to
a fair share,'24 because  the content of the fair-share  right itself can be
defined only through politics.  It follows, then, that if, as I have argued,
there are political  rights that themselves  are welfare  rights, then those
welfare  rights are a fortiori  entailments of Fried's  Kantian conception
of a system of rights.  Fried's system  cannot do without the fair-share
right;  it cannot get  to the  fair-share right without  political rights; and
political rights  (by an easy  step  from Fried's  own  arguments)  encom-
120.  Id  at  128.
121.  See Michelman,  Welfare Rights, supra note  I, at  1002-03.
122.  See C.  FRIED, supra note 7.  at  119.
123.  Id  at  129.
124.  See id  at  109.
Number 3]
Wash U Law Repository684  WASHINGTON  UNIVERSITY  LAW  QUARTERLY
pass  welfare  rights.'
2 5  Fried's  conception  thus  falls  into  line  with
Rawls's-unsurprisingly,  given  their  shared  Kantian  inspirations-
which I have previously  described as  "imputing to  representative per-
sons a structured set of priorities under which the question of generally
amplifying  one's  income  simply  is  not reached  until  adequate  assur-
ance has  been made  for what one specifically  needs  in order that  his
basic rights, liberties, and opportunities may be effectively enjoyed, and
his self-respect maintained."' 26
More germane to present purposes  is the convergence  of Fried's im-
plicit view with Ely's.  It is a virtue of Ely's reading of the Constitution
that it  forces  us  to consider  seriously  whether  our  commitment  to  a
certain institutional system-that of majoritarian republicanism or rep-
resentative democracy--does  not also commit us to a recognition  of an
exceptional class of positive rights and, to that extent, to a recognition
of the state which that system constitutes as a bearer of affirmative  du-
ties.  Through a lawyerlike  parsing of constitutional  text, history, and
structure, Ely makes a plausible case for the Constitution's own express
recognition of a class  of general  constitutional  rights  and  (it seems to
me) an overwhelming  (again, I don't know whether intended) case for
inclusion in that class of minimum welfare rights-rights  to the indis-
pensable means  of effective  participation in the institutional system it-
self.
That system's  appeal and its legitimacy have from the beginning  re-
sided in its claim to be a universally fair and unbiased process both for
translating the background rights into a defined and ordered scheme of
legal  rights  and  for  determining  which  additional  interest  in  what
measures should be served through the regulatory and resource-gather-
ing capabilities of the state.  It seems  to be a condition  of the system's
own legitimacy and, therefore, a duty of the system and its beneficiaries
that it be insured against bias arising out of the existence or distribution
of unmet needs.  The precise content of that duty will vary with histori-
cal circumstance, which is a good reason why the duty and its correla-
tive rights should be among those whose  definition is always left as  "a
delegation  to future  constitutional  decision  makers."' 27  For  sundry
reasons that I have previously mentioned, the duty seems to be one that
125.  See notes  114-17  supra and accompanying  text.
126.  Michelman,  Constitutional  Welfare Rights and  A  Theory of  Justice, in READING  RAWLS:
CRITICAL  STUDIES  OF A  THEORY  OF JUSTICE 319,  347  (1975).
127.  See note 43 supra and accompanying  text.
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courts  acting  alone  cannot or  ought not undertake  to  define,  impose,
and enforce.  Indeed,  the texts  themselves  would hardly tolerate judi-
cial enforcement in the face of legislative passivity.' 28 But suppose that
the  historical  circumstances  indicate  the  existence  of unmet  welfare
needs whose satisfaction  is encompassed within the duty.  Suppose also
that  a  legislative action-the  creation  of a governmental  program  for
supplementing  incomes  or providing  services-seems  geared  towards
meeting those needs.  What, then, could be more in order than for the
courts to treat that legislative action as intended to satisfy constitutional
duties and rights when questions arise about how its provisions should
be construed,  or  about how the  claims it generates  should  be held  to
interact  with  other  constitutional  doctrines  such  as  procedural  due
proctss or unreasonable classification?'29  Why, then, should courts en-
gagec  in these tasks go out of their way to deny that they are respond-
ing tc  claims of constitutional  rights?
128.  Claims against  others that  they  affirmatively  provide  for one's needs  (wants,  interests)
plainly are not "'immunities."  In modem analytic  usage, "privilege,"  like "immunity,"  connotes a
negative  claim, ie., the pursuit  of some  activity free of legal liability or sanction.  See Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental  Legal Conceptions as Applied  in Judicial  Reasoning,  23  YALE L.J.  16 (1913)  (In
the  context of section  one of the  fourteenth  amendment,  "privilege"  obviously cannot carry  its
ordinary  lay meaning of an  indulgence to  which one has no  institutional claim.).  Even if history
allows the speculation that "privilege"  appears in the fourteenth amendment with the sense  borne
by "claim right"  in the latter day Hohfeldian system, the fourteenth amendment guarantees  privi-
leges, like immunities, only against abridgment by the making or enforcement  of laws.  The purely
quiescent state evidently cannot violate the  "privileges or immunities"  clause.  Perhaps under ap-
propriate  circumstances it can be said to deny the equal  protection of the laws, but only with an
obvious strain on  usage.
129.  See note 118 supra and  accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A
In the  six-year  period from  1969  to  1974,  the  Supreme  Court  decided  a
number of cases relevant to the welfare-rights  thesis.  In this appendix, I dis-
cuss cases whose holdings are consistent with the thesis, but which were placed
by  the Court's  opinions on alternate  grounds.
'Right to Travel" Cases
In Shapiro v. Thompson' 30 the Court held that durational residency condi-
tions on the  availability of AFDC benefits  violate the "fundamental  right of
interstate movement."'1 31 Yet the Court also found it significant that the chal-
lenged requirement  operated  to "[deny]  welfare  aid upon which may depend
the ability of families  to obtain the very means to subsist-food, shelter, and
other  necessities  of  life.' 132  Similarly,  in  Memorial Hospital v.  Maricopa
County133 the Supreme  Court found that a durational residency  requirement
for medical  care  benefits unconstitutionally  infringed  upon the right  "to  mi-
grate" and "resettle"  from one state to another. 13 4  Yet central in its reasoning
was the observation  that "medical care is as much 'a basic necessity  of life'  to
an  indigent as welfare  assistance."'
35
"Irrationality"  Cases
United States  Department  of.4griculture v. Moreno  1 36 held that the exclusion
of unrelated households  from food-stamp  benefits denied equal protection  of
the laws  because the classification bore no rational relationship to any legiti-
mate purpose of the legislation.'37  United  States Department of,4griculture V.
Murry138 invalidated as an impermissible  "irrebutable presumption"  a provi-
sion  that excluded  from  the food-stamp  program  households  that  contained
another person's claimed tax dependent. 39  Ne;v Jersey Wefare Rights Organi-
zation v. Cahil'14 0 ruled that the denial of welfare benefits to families contain-
ing  illegitimate children  violated the  equal protection  clause  because  "there
130.  394 U.S.  618  (1969).
131.  Id  at  638.
132.  id  at 627.
133.  415 U.S.  250  (1974).
134.  Id  at 255.
135.  Id  at 259 (quoting  HEW  REPORT  ON  MEDICAL  RESOURCES  AVAILABLE  TO  MEET THE
NEEDS  OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE  RECIPIENTS,  HOUSE  COMM.  ON WAYS  AND  MEANS,  87th. Cong.,
1st  Sess. 74 (Comm. Print  1961)).
136.  413 U.S.  528  (1973).
137.  Id  at 535-36.
138.  413 U.S.  508  (1973).
139.  Id  at 514.
140.  411  U.S.  619  (1973).
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can be no doubt that the benefits  extended  under the challenged program are
as  indispensable  to  the health  and well-being  of illegitimate  children as  to
those who are legitimate."'
14 1
*Procedural  Fairness"  Cases
In Goldberg  v. Kelly,
142  Sniadach v. Family  Finance Corp.,
143 and Fuentes v.
Shevin, 44  statutory  schemes  ran  afoul of the  due process  clause,  ostensibly
because they authorized interruption of benefit streams or possessory interests
without prior opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on the question of legal
entitlement, eligibility, or default.  Yet in  Goldberg the Court found it neces-
sary  to  observe  that  "welfare  provides  the  means  to  obtain  essential  food,
clothing, housing, and medical  care,"'
145 that  "from its  founding the Nation's
basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons
within its borders,"'
146 that "welfare.  . . can help bring within the reach of the
poor the same opportunities  that are available to others to participate mean-
ingfully in the life of the community,"' 147 and that "public  assistance, then, is
not mere charity, but a means to 'procure the Blessing of Liberty  to ourselves
and  our Posterity'."'148  In Sniadach the Court  plainly  relied,  in  part, on its
observation  that  "a prejudgment garnishment.  . . may as  a practical  matter
drive a wage-earning family to the wall." 149  In Fuentes, however, the Court-
although noting that "a stove or a bed may be.  . . essential to provide a mini-
mally decent environment for human beings in their daily lives"--denied that
Goldberg and Sniadach depended,  or that  in general the due process right to
be heard before benefits or possessions  are withdrawn depends, on whether or
in what sense those benefits  or possessions  are "necessities."'
150
141.  Id  at 621.
142.  397  U.S.  254 (1970).
143.  395  U.S. 337  (1969).
144.  407 U.S.  67  (1972).
145.  397 U.S.  at 264.
146.  Id  at 264-65.
147.  Id  at 265.
148.  Id
149.  395  U.S. at 341-42.
150.  407 U.S. at 89-90.
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APPENDIX  B
Ostensibly Contradictory  Decisions That Need Not Be So Regarded
Dandridge  v. Williams151  and Jefferson v. Hackney152 may well be viewed as
reflecting the lack of clear standards for defining the extent of welfare rights-
a feature that may restrict courts to certain indirect modes of acting upon these
rights, but  does not require  repudiation of them. 153  In Dandridge Maryland
provided welfare  assistance  to all families that  its law defined  as needy,  but
granted somewhat less per capita to larger families.  The Court simply had no
basis to conclude  that  the amount  allotted to any family fell below the (judi-
cially  unspecifiable)  minimum  welfare-rights  standard,  or  to  disregard  the
State's apparent conclusion that "inherent economies of scale"  in larger fami-
lies justify the use of scaled-down per capita payments for larger families as a
good method  for "allocating  available public  funds in such a way as fully  to
meet the needs of the largest possible number of families." 154  Jefferson yields
easily to  an essentially similar account.
In neither James v.  Valierra1 55 nor Lindsey v. Normet156 was the principle
of an individual's constitutional right to minimally adequate shelter at stake in
an ultimate sense.  Nothing in that principle requires a state to use, as one of
its devices  for realizing the right, a requirement  that subsidized  housing for
low-income  families  be admitted  into municipalities  where  a majority of the
residents object  (at least until it plainly appears that tolerance for local exclu-
sion  makes realization  a practical  impossibility), or to allow a landlord's  de-
fault on repair obligations  as a defense to a landlord's action for possession on
grounds  of rent default.  On the other hand, the principle  would be directly
challenged  by allowing  the  state  to  evict  occupants  from  publicly  assisted
housing for the  needy without prior opportunity  for the occupant  to contest
the  eviction  on some  ground such  as  lack  of need  or antisocial  conduct.' 5 7
Lower courts have regularly held that such evictions would deprive occupants
of property without due process of law,'58 and the Supreme Court has, on the
one occasion when the question came before it, reached a compatible result in
reliance on an administrative  regulation.1
59
151.  397 U.S. 471  (1970).
152.  406 U.S.  535  (1972).
153.  See Michelman,  Welfare  Rights supra note  1;  note 22 supra and accompanying  text.
154.  397 U.S. at 479-80, 484.
155.  402 U.S.  137  (1971).
156.  405  U.S.  56  (1972).
157.  See note 22 supra and  accompanying text.
158.  See Michelman, Formal  andAssociational  Aims in Procedural  Due Process, supra note  1.
159.  See Thorpe v. Housing  Auth., 393  U.S. 268  (1969).
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In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
160  the Court, ob-
serving  that  Texas  made  some  positive  effort  through  its  program  of state
financial assistance to supply its local school districts with means to provide a
minimally adequate  education and that  "no charge fairly could be made that
the system fails to provide each child with the opportunity to acquire the basic
minimal skills necessary  for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process,"  16'  expressly left open the possibility that
"some  identifiable quantum  of education  is  a  constitutionally protected  pre-
requisite to the meaningful  exercise of [voting and free-expression  rights]"' 62
and that plaintiffs might have a valid claim "if a State's financing system occa-
sioned  an  absolute  denial  of educational  opportunities  to  any  of its  chil-
dren."1
63
Unpersuasive  Alternative Explanations  for Welfare-Rights Holdings
The asserted  "right  to travel"  basis  for Shapiro and Memorial Hospital' 64
fails to give an adequate account of Sosna v. Iowa,'65 Starns v.  Malkerson,166
or Calfano v. Gautier Torres.1
67  If the constitutional  objection  to  residency
requirements truly was their actual or likely "chilling effect" on the exercise of
interstate  migration  rights-their  actual  or likely  effect  of deterring,  encum-
bering,  or  practically  preventing  migration-then  the  Sosna  and  Gautier
Torres decisions  would  be  insupportable.  The  scheme  upheld  in  Gautier
Torres certainly  had  the  most  obvious  deterrent  potential  of all  those  ex-
amined in the right-to-travel and residency-requirement  series:  all persons re-
ceiving social security benefits plainly  had to make a  heavy, easily calculable
sacrifice if they chose to move to Puerto Rico.  As for Sosna, a year's denial to
new residents  of access  to a  state's divorce  courts certainly  seems at least  as
likely  to  block  or  deter  migration  that  might  otherwise  have occured  as  a
year's denial  of publicly provided, nonemergency  medical care for newly ar-
rived indigents, especially  when one notes that the divorce-court exclusion has
a potential bearing on the migration choices of the affluent as well as-indeed,
almost certainly more than-those of the indigent, but the medical-care exclu-
sion  affects only the indigent.
In its Memorial  Hospital  opinion the Court, apparently recognizing the diffi-
160.  411  U.S.  1 (1973).
161.  Id  at 37.
162.  Id  at 36.
163.  Id  at 37.
164.  See notes  130-35 supra and  accompanying text.
165.  419 U.S. 393  (1975).
166.  326  F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn.  1970), af'd,  401  U.S.  985  (1971).
167.  435 U.S.  1 (1978)  (right to travel not infringed by statutory scheme that pays nonsubsis-
tence social security benefits to persons  residing in the 50 states, but cuts off benefits to those who
move  to Puerto Rico).
Number 3]
Wash U Law Repository690  WASHINGTON  UNIVERSITY  LAW  QUARTERLY
culties implicit in a doctrine that treats deterrence as the factor selectively tying
residency requirements to the right of interstate migration (the migration right
invalidating the residency requirement only when one of a select class of bene-
fits  is  at stake),  proposed instead that the penalty is the key concept. 168  The
key  benefit-specific  question,  then, is whether  the denial of a  benefit to  new
arrivals operates to "penalize"  migration.  Exactly how  the notion of "penaliz-
ing"  differs from that of "deterring"  has never been made clear.  One concep-
tually satisfactory  answer  is  that  a  penalty  represents  a  state's expression  of
hostility towards new  arrivals or of deprecation  towards their personal inter-
ests  and needs.  But if that is  what a  "penalty"  signifies,  then  denying  new
arrivals  the  advantages  of reduced  college  tuition  fees that  other bona  fide
residents enjoy is clearly within the category, and Stans is inexplicable.
The  only remaining  possibility  is  that  "penalizing"  the  choice  to  migrate
means  exacting  a  price  for  its  exercise  (in  temporarily  withheld  benefits),
which in some sense is "too high" or "disproportionate."  If so, then from what
sources has the Court contrived  the moral scale according  to which having to
wait  a year for free emergency medical care (which few will ever need) is too
high a price, but having to wait a year for divorce-access  or tuition benefits is
not?  Must  not the  Constitution itself somehow  be the  source?,
69  Does  not
there emerge, then, the categorical  notion of a  constitutional  right to be pro-
vided, in case  of need, with  "the  basic necessities of life?"' 7 °
The Moreno-Murry-  Cahill  series of cases discussed earlier' 7 1 also merits fur-
ther examination.  The Court explained Moreno as simply a case of a classifi-
cation  that bore  no  rational  relationship  to  any  legitimate  purpose  of the
legislation in which it appeared.  The evident purposes of the food-stamp  leg-
islation, in the Court's view, were to absorb agricultural surpluses and to feed
the hungry.  Excluding otherwise eligible unrelated households had nothing to
do with either of those purposes.  Furthermore, insofar as one can infer from
the exclusion itself an additional purpose to disadvantage those who choose to
live in unrelated households, a "bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.,  2  But
the matter is not  so clear.  It  is  perfectly possible  to view  the congressional
purpose  in Moreno not as that of "harming"  those who  choose to live  com-
munally, but as providing  a special kind  or degree  of support for traditional
family units.  It might be,  in the dissenting  opinion's  words,  "that the basic
unit  which  . . . [Congress]  was  willing  to  support  with  federal  funding
through food stamps is some variation on the family as we know it-a house-
168.  415 U.S. at 257-58.
169.  See notes  19-21 supra and accompanying text.
170.  415 U.S. at 259.
171.  See notes  136-41  supra and accompanying text.
172.  413 U.S. at 534 (emphasis in original).
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hold consisting of related individuals."' 73  That it is constitutionally impermis-
sible  for  government  to  offer  preferential  support  to  traditional  family
groupings, but leave unconventional  or unrelated households to shift for them-
selves, is not a view that can be fairly ascribed174 to a Court that would shortly
rule as this one did in Belle Terre  . Boraas 75 and, subsequently, in Moore v.
East Cleveland.  1 76  Justice  Douglas'  opinion for the Court in Belle Terre un-
dermines  his suggestion in Moreno that the constitutional  defect  in the unre-
lated-households  exclusion  is  its  encroachment  on  a  freedom-of-household-
association  specially protected  by the first amendment. 77  In sum, the no-ra-
tional-relationship-to-purpose  reasoning used  by the Moreno Court  depends
upon  the  restriction  of statutory purpose  to  that of feeding  the needy.  This
restriction itself is either a judicial coup de main or a manifestation of a consti-
tutional right to needed food (since it cannot be a right to live in an unrelated
household).
A  basically  similar critique  applies  to Murry.  For some  reason  the Court
chose to base its decision in Murry on "irrebuttable  presumption" rather than
"rational basis"  analysis.  "Irrebuttable  presumption"  as an independent basis
for constitutional invalidation has since run into severe academic criticism and
judicial  retrenchment.  In fact, the Court's  refusal  to accept  an  "irrebuttable
presumption"  claim in  Weinberger v. Sapi,178 a case bearing close  structural
similarities  to  Murry  (except  that  the  benefit  involved-survivors'  benefits
under social security-was not so directly subsistence-related),  forced the Sax
Court to reanalyze Murry as a "no rational relationship"  case. 1 79  Thus under-
stood, Murry, like Moreno, must at bottom rest on a constitutional  right to be
furnished with needed means of subsistence.
Cahill requires  a  somewhat  different  treatment.  Ostensibly,  the  constitu-
tional  objection to excluding  families with children,  all of whom  are illegiti-
mate,  from  AFDC  benefits  is  that  the  exclusion  constitutes  invidious
discrimination  against the  more-or-less  "suspect"  class  of illegitimates.  But
that  understanding  of the  decision  has  difficulty  surviving  Mathews v. Lu-
173.  Id  at 546  (Rehnquist, J.,  dissenting).
174.  See Michelman,  Political  Markets and Communit , Self-Determination:  Competing Judi-
cial Models ofLocal Government Legilimac,  53  IND.  L.J.  145,  189-94  (1977-1978).
175.  416  U.S.  1 (1974)  (ordinance  restricting  land-use  to one-family dwellings  and  defining
family as more  than one  person related  by blood,  adoption, or  marriage, or not  more than  two
unrelated  persons  living as single household upheld  as valid land-use legislation aimed at family
needs).
176.  431  U.S. 494  (1977)  (ordinance that limits occupancy  of dwelling to  particular members
of family,  excluding  others  related  by  blood,  invalid  under  due  process  clause  of fourteenth
amendment).
177.  United States Dep't of Agriculture  v. Moreno,  413  U.S.  528,  541-42 (1973)  (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
178.  422 U.S. 749  (1975).
179.  Id  at 772.
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cas.1 8 °  Lucas challenged  a  social  security  statute  that  provided  survivors'
benefits to all dependent children of deceased, covered  individuals.  The stat-
ute required  illegitimate children, however,  to prove actual  dependency  (ac-
cording  to  defined  criteria),  but  presumed  the  dependency  of  legitimate
children without specific proof. In upholding the statutory scheme, the Court,
of course, had to disavow any idea that statutory discriminations  disadvanta-
geous  to  illegitimates  as  a  class  are  ipso  facto  "invidious"  and  unconstitu-
tional.  In distinguishing Lucas from Cahill,  the Court viewed the purpose of
the  social  security  survivors'  benefit  in  Lucas as  identical  with  that  of  the
AFDC payment in Cahill,  ie., to provide income for persons in need.  But in
Lucas, unlike Cahill,  the statute did not exclude an illegitimate claimant from
the benefit if his need was demonstrably genuine; if he proved dependency, he
could collect.  The  Court further observed  in Lucas that administrative  con-
venience  could justify excusing legitimate  children  from  specifically  proving
dependency.  But the "administrative  convenience"  justification  is  secondary
to the observation that the Lucas scheme, unlike that in Cahill,  will not result
in deprivation of needed income to those who really need it; thus, it seems that
need, rather  than illegitimacy,  is  the  truly  operative  constitutional  factor  in
Cahill. The recent decision in La/li v.  La/li,'8' which rejected an illegitimate's
claim of unconstitutionally  discriminatory  treatment  under state  inheritance
laws  and  sharply  limited  the  opposite-tending  decision  in  Trimble  v.
Gordon,'82 is consistent with this view.  Inheritance does not directly implicate
"the  basic necessities  of life"  as do AFDC and, to a  lesser degree, survivors'
benefits.
What remains to be considered is whether or how far the due process expla-
nation for Goldberg, which established a constitutional right to an evidentiary
hearing prior to termination of AFDC benefits, should be taken to negate any
inference from that  decision of a constitutional  right to the means of subsis-
tence.  The  language  of the  Goldberg opinion  supports  this  inference' s3  as
does the Court's subsequent affirmation in Mathews v.  Eldridge'1 4  that ordina-
rily "something  less than an evidentiary  hearing prior to adverse  administra-
tive action [is sufficient]"  to satisfy the right to due process.18 5
In the Eldridge case the Court upheld against due process  attack a  scheme
for terminating social security disability benefits that assured prior notification
to  the  recipient  of  the  grounds  for  the  proposed  termination,  offered  a
pretermination  opportunity for written submissions  by the recipient,  delayed
180.  427 U.S. 495  (1976).
181.  439 U.S. 259  (1978).
182.  430 U.S. 762 (1977).
183.  See text accompanying notes  145-48 supra.
184.  424 U.S. 319  (1976).
185.  Id  at 343.
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the opportunity  for an evidentiary  hearing until after termination,  and pro-
vided for retroactive payment of interim benefits if the post-termination  hear-
ing held the cutoff to have been erroneous.  The Court distinguished Goldberg
in part on the ground that the AFDC payment at stake in  Goldberg, unlike the
social security disability benefit in Eldridge, represented the irreducible means
of subsistence.  It would be too  facile, however, to infer from this distinction
alone any judicial apprehension  of a  right to subsistence.  The Court's point,
or one of its points, was that an interim  deprivation  of subsistence payments
cannot practically be remedied by retroactive payment following a post-termi-
nation hearing (what will have happened in the meantime to the claimant mis-
takenly  denied  the  means  of subsistence?),  but the  same  is  not  true  of an
interim lapse of disability payments (although  a lapse  might have forced  the
claimant to go "on welfare" in the meantime).  Thus, one might have no more
of a constitutional  right to subsistence  payments than to disability payments,
but  denial  of a  pretermination  hearing could  be  a deprivation  of property
without due  process with  respect to the former  type of benefit but not to the
latter.
The  force  of that argument,  however,  is  at least  partially  diminished  by
Dixon  ,.  Love,
186  which  upheld  a  state  scheme  for  revocation  of a  driver's
license prior to any evidentiary hearing in the case of a license held by a man
employed as a truck driver.187  The Court opined that the interim deprivation,
if later shown to have been mistaken, could not be compensated adequately by
a  retroactive  payment.  Accordingly,  the  Court  had  no way  to  distinguish
Goldberg, except  to  observe that "a  driver's license  may not be so vital and
essential as are social insurance payments on which the recipient may depend
for his very subsistence."' 88  It might  be argued that reliance  on this distinc-
tion still does not signify recognition of a right to subsistence, as distinguished
from a right to due process, because  as Eldridge clearly holds, the determina-
tion of what process is constitutionally "due" depends in part on the gravity of
the personal interest at stake.  But that argument just takes us back again to
the question of whence  the Court  derives  its scale  for weighing  "gravity,"  if
not from  the Constitution.
186.  431  U.S.  105  (1977).
187.  Id  at  112-15.
188.  Id  at  113.
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